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This study investigates trade effects of the regional liberalization of technical barriers to trade (TBTs) 
in the form of harmonization and mutual recognition agreements (MRAs) for testing procedures. The 
theoretical part of the paper is framed in terms of a heterogeneous firms approach. This paper adds to 
the existing literature by formalizing the effects of MRAs and harmonization initiatives on bilateral 
trade flows and by applying this new theoretical framework in the empirical part of the paper. The 
latter consists of a two-stage gravity estimation and investigates sectoral effects of regional TBT 
liberalization on parties to the agreement as well as excluded industrialized and developing countries. It 
finds that MRAs have a strong positive influence on both export probabilities and trade volumes for 
partner countries. Regarding harmonization, results seem to suggest that the impact on parties to the 
agreement is negligible, however that on excluded OECD countries is large and positive. Third party 
developing countries do not seem to benefit from the market integration effect brought about by 
harmonization in other regions. Overall, effects on the probability that a new firm will export are much 
more pronounced than effects on the trade volumes of incumbent exporters. 
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th century drew to a close, GATT’s original goal of a gradual abolishment of 
tariffs and quotas had been achieved to a considerable extent. Yet, as Robert Baldwin 
points out as early as 1970, this leaves the playing field still far from level: “The 
lowering of tariffs has, in effect, been like draining a swamp. The lower water level 
has revealed all the snags and stumps of non-tariff barriers that still have to be cleared 
away.” With tariff barriers becoming increasingly less important, differences in 
national regulatory regimes are becoming ever more visible. These regulatory regimes 
include areas as varied as government procurement rules, inward foreign investment, 
competition policy, labor standards and environmental norms as well as product 
standards and technical regulations (Hoekman, Mattoo, English, 2002).  
 
This paper has singled out technical regulations (termed technical barriers to trade or 
TBTs in the WTO context) as one particular domestic regulatory regime and will 
analyze the means that have been employed in recent years to overcome the negative 
trade-effects thereof.  
 
Firm-level surveys conducted in both industrial and developing countries, consistently 
identify technical regulations (along with rules of origin and customs procedures) as 
the main non-tariff export constraint (World Bank TBT Survey, 2004; OECD meta-
survey 2003). Richard Baldwin (2000) points out that TBTs have been the main 
concern of the EU as far as trade barriers are concerned ever since the abolishment of 
all internal tariffs in 1973. In the context of the recently launched trade talks between 
the EU and ASEAN, Pascal Lamy expressed the belief that harmonizing standards 
and rules in areas such as safety, health or consumer protection rather than abolishing 
tariffs and quotas, were “the real 21
st century trade issues”.
1 The urgency of the topic 
is further underlined by the significant rise in WTO dispute settlement case load that 
turns on standards-related issues. 
 
This study will investigate trade effects of TBT liberalization in the form of 
harmonization and mutual recognition agreements for testing procedures (MRAs). 
The theoretical part of the paper is framed in terms of Melitz’s (2003) heterogeneous 
firms approach. The paper develops Melitz’s model so as to formalize the effects of 
MRAs and harmonization initiatives on bilateral trade flows and applies this new 
theoretical framework in the empirical part of the paper. The latter consists of a two-
stage gravity estimation and investigates sectoral effects of TBT liberalization on 
parties to the agreement as well as excluded industrialized and developing countries 
respectively. 
 
In Section I, technical issues surrounding standards as well as liberalization efforts in 
this area will be discussed. Different types of standards will be defined and classified. 
The paper will subsequently focus only on government imposed technical regulations. 
The various categories of legal instruments that have been employed to overcome 
trade-distorting effects connected to them will be discussed. The analysis will then 
focus on harmonization initiatives and mutual recognition agreements (MRAs) of 
testing procedures as two such instruments.  
 
                                                 
1 quoted in Chen and Mattoo (2004)   4
Section II provides a brief overview of the existing theoretical and empirical literature 
on the topic, which is currently not very extensive. Most empirical papers on the 
subject lack sound theoretical underpinnings, a weakness that this paper attempts to 
overcome.  
 
Sections III and IV discuss the theoretical model and empirical derivation upon which 
the analysis will be based. Within these sections, the existing theory is developed so 
as to formalize issues arising from TBT liberalization. In Melitz (2003), the decision 
of a firm to enter into an export market hinges crucially on the level of fixed cost in a 
given market. It is here, that technical barriers to trade as an important type of fixed 
export cost are introduced into the model. TBT liberalization can then take the form 
of MRAs – modelled in this paper as a reduction in fixed export cost – or complete 
harmonization – modelled here as an elimination of fixed costs for all but the home 
market, such that a firm is now making a joint entry decision for all markets in the 
harmonizing region. Despite the fact that formally modelling effects of such 
preferential liberalization agreements on excluded countries is beyond the scope of 
this paper, this aspect is included in the empirical part. 
 
Crucially, in particular for the empirical analysis, Melitz points to two margins of 
adjustment for trade flows arising from the endogenous firm selection process: the 
volume of trade flows will be determined by the volume of exports by each individual 
exporting firm (the intensive margin) as well as the fraction of firms actually 
exporting (the extensive margin). This theoretical background gives rise to a two-
stage estimation structure, where the first stage consists of a probit gravity equation 
yielding a proxy for the extensive margin. The latter is then used to correct for 
heterogeneity bias in the second stage of the estimation, which is an otherwise 
standard gravity equation (in effect a Tobit II model with correction for firm 
heterogeneity).  
 
Implementation issues are discussed in Section V. The analysis is conducted at the 
sectoral level, focusing on the telecoms and medical device industries. It is found that 
MRAs have a strong positive influence on both export probabilities and trade volumes 
for partner countries. Regarding harmonization, results seem to suggest that the 
impact on parties to the agreement is negligible, however that on excluded OECD 
countries is large and positive. Excluded developing countries generally do not seem 
to benefit from the market integration effect brought about by harmonization in other 
regions. Overall, effects on the probability that a new firm will export are much more 
pronounced than effects on the trade volumes of incumbent exporters. Results are 
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SECTION I 
 
Taxonomy of Standards 
 
Technical barriers to trade can be seen as resulting from standards that specify either 
product characteristics or process and production methods. Baldwin (2000) 
distinguishes between two aspects of these standards (both of which create a barrier): 
i) content of the standard and ii) testing procedures necessary to demonstrate that a 
product complies with a given standard. 
 
The WTO defines a standard as follows: 
(…) standards set out specific characteristics of a product — such as its size, 
shape, design, functions and performance, or the way it is labeled or packaged 
before it is put on sale. In certain cases, the way a product is produced can 
affect these characteristics, and it may then prove more appropriate to draft 
(…) standards in terms of a product's process and production methods rather 
than its characteristics per se. (…) 
 
Given this definition, this section describes the three situations where standards are 
necessary. These are (1) where compatibility a) of inputs or b) among final products 
needs to be assured; (2) where there is asymmetric information between producers 
and consumers about product quality; and (3) in situations where goods are produced 
or consumed under negative externalities. Case 1 is generally taken care of by the 
market. Since cases 2 and 3 are situations of market failure, however, government 
intervention will be necessary.  
 
•  Case 1a: Standards are often needed to ensure compatibility between product 
parts. In cases where firms are vertically integrated, these standards are 
generally proprietary to the individual firm. However, the logic of splitting the 
production process vertically and creating competition between the suppliers 
of inputs would require these standards to be made public. Increased 
standardization of inputs will benefit the firms which assemble the final 
products as it serves to thicken supplier markets and thereby depresses prices 
of inputs. This decrease in margin will hurt incumbents in the input market, 
yet at the same time, the reduction in entry barriers that is caused by the fact 
that technology for inputs is no longer proprietary opens the way for new 
entrants.  
 
•  Case 1b: Compatibility between final products is particularly crucial for any 
kind of network product (such as fax machines or computer software). When a 
new network product is brought to the market, every firm will want to impose 
their standard on the entire market, so as to have an initial advantage in terms 
of production cost. The new common standard can arise either through a 
standards war or a mutual agreement between firms in the industry (cf. 
product cycle literature, e.g. Utterbach and Suarez’s (1993) notion of 
“dominant design”). Government should not intervene in this process unless 
the standard that is imposed on the market is proprietary to an individual firm 
(because technology is proprietary), which would in certain cases have to raise 
anti-competitive concerns. 
   6
It should be noted that in both of the above cases, standards are needed for efficiency 
reasons. Baldwin (2000) calls these horizontal standards. Unless there is a danger of 
sub-optimal convergence or convergence inertia, the market can be expected to 
generate optimal common standards and government intervention is hence 
unwarranted. 
 
Further, cases 2 and 3 describe situations where standards are required in order to 
correct for market failure. Rather than being just technical specifications, these are 
minimum quality standards to guarantee the health and safety of the consumer or the 
protection of the environment – Baldwin (2000) calls these vertical standards. 
Pelkmans (2003) refers to them as SHEC standards (Safety, Health, Environment and 
Consumer Protection). These are the types of standards that tend to get the largest 
public attention, as they are TBTs that can easily be portrayed as protecting local 
consumers from low-quality imports. 
 
•  Case 2 is concerned with asymmetric information about product quality – the 
case of experience and credence goods. An experience good is defined as a 
good, the quality of which can be ascertained only after consumption. In the 
case of a credence good, on the other hand, certain product characteristics may 
never be revealed to the consumer even after consumption. The market failure 
in this case is asymmetric information about the true characteristics of the 
product, including health and safety features. An example for an experience 
good would be a motorcycle helmet, the true quality of which would only be 
revealed during an accident. Since the consumer has no possibility of verifying 
the quality of the product ex ante, government will have to step in and impose 
minimum standards that guarantee the health and safety of the consumer. An 
example for a credence good would be bottled water, the true quality of which 
a consumer will never be able to establish. Again, government intervention is 
necessary. 
 
•  Finally, case 3 deals with goods that are produced or consumed under negative 
externalities, meaning that there are negative side effects on third parties from 
the consumption and production of goods which are ignored in the 
consumption/production decision. Under the assumption of complete 
information, the most efficient outcome would be reached by imposing an 
appropriate tax. However, in a second best world, where information is 
incomplete, setting a minimum/maximum standard might be the optimal 
solution to solving the externality problem. Often cited examples are 
maximum levels of lead in petrol or of pesticide residues on agricultural 
goods.  
 
One can conclude from the above, that standards no matter whether private or public 
are in all three cases necessary. Both asymmetric information and negative 
externalities are market failures and hence require government intervention, here in 
the form of minimum quality standards. These may vary by country depending on the 
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Standards as Trade Barriers 
 
Despite the fact that standards are important in achieving efficiency, their presence 
can turn out to be an obstacle to trade: while integrating the markets of those who 
participate, standards can act as a barrier to those who are excluded. In the case of 
compatibility standards, market forces will act to bring standards in line with those 
generally prevailing in the market, even though these standards are technically 
voluntary. Products not meeting these standards may simply not be demanded by 
firms/consumers as they are incompatible with the other inputs (as in Case 1a) or the 
prevailing network (as in Case 1b). In the case of government imposed quality 
standards, on the other hand, compliance is mandatory. In this case the standards are 
also known as technical regulations. Products not meeting these technical regulations 
will be banned from the market.  
 
Country-specific standards effectively create additional costs for foreign producers by 
forcing them to adjust their product and production process so as to meet individual 
national standards. Further costs will arise from the requirement to subsequently 
prove conformity with these standards (World Bank TBT Survey, 2004; Baldwin, 
2000; Chen and Mattoo, 2004; Wilson, Chen and Otsuki, 2006). This creates two 
negative side effects: Firstly, foreign producers are hurt by increased (possibly 
prohibitive) production costs. This may turn out to be particularly burdensome for 
developing countries trying to get access to industrialized countries’ markets.
2 
Second, by creating artificial entry barriers to national markets, standards have a 
negative effect on efficiency. This is due to the fact that firms which are forced to 
meet different standards for different markets are unable to take advantage of 
economies of scale, thereby dampening productive efficiency. As markets remain 
segmented by standards barriers, firms are further able to raise price over marginal 
cost, implying less allocative efficiency than could be reached with integrated 
markets. Even though standards are valuable in and of themselves, these effects have 
to be taken into account when setting them.  
 
Additionally, Baldwin (2000) points to a “magnification effect of globalization”: the 
greater the freeness of trade, the greater the effect of any remaining barriers especially 
from an economic geography point of view. In other words, a reduction in distortion 
arising from tariff barriers, will lead to an increased impact of regulatory differences 
on the location of production. Finally, such regulations can easily be abused by 
protectionists to create artificial entry barriers to the domestic market. It is generally 
difficult to tell, which purpose a particular standard or regulation serves, but there is 
likely to be an element of both motivations in either. This inherent ambiguity makes it 
difficult to overcome standards and regulations as technical barriers to trade (TBTs) 
entirely, but two second-best measures in particular – harmonization and mutual 
recognition of testing procedures – will be the subject of this paper. The paper will 
focus on liberalization/harmonization of government-imposed regulations rather than 
voluntary industry standards.  
 
                                                 
2 cf. World Bank Survey on TBTs: Wilson and Otsuki (2004) “Standards and Technical Regulations 
and Firms in Developing Countries: New evidence from a World Bank Technical Barriers to Trade 
Survey”; find that standards and technical regulations are an important factor affecting a firm’s 
operation and ability to export.   8
But, yet again, care must be taken that liberalization of these barriers does not happen 
in a way that results in a disadvantage for the weakest. The way technical barriers to 
trade are being tackled at the moment, i.e. mainly through agreements between 
industrialized countries, might mean even more trade diversion away from developing 





Even though standards have been shown to constitute a barrier to trade, they are 
valuable in and of themselves as argued above. Since removing the standards 
themselves is therefore not an option, the level playing field will have to be created by 
accepting their presence and making them compatible. Disciplines imposed by the 
WTO in this regard are relatively lax due to the fact that the optimal level of health or 
safety standards depends to a large extent on the level of development of the 
individual country, so that it is currently impossible to impose common standards for 
all WTO members. Some provisions in this regard are, however, contained in the 
Agreements on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT).
3  
 
The Preamble to the WTO TBT Agreement states that  
 
“no country should be prevented from taking measures necessary to ensure the 
quality of its exports, or for the protection of human, animal, and plant life or 
health, of the environment, or for the prevention of deceptive practices, at the 
levels it considers appropriate”. However, the regulatory flexibility of WTO 
members is limited by the requirement that technical regulations “are not 
prepared, adopted or applied with a view to, or with the effect of, creating 
unnecessary obstacles to trade.” (Article 2.2) 
 
In addition, the TBT Agreement sets some basic guidelines in terms of transparency, 
proportionality (“balancing” requirement, i.e. the measure implemented should be 
proportional to the desired objective), necessity, and consistency.
4 These provisions 
are necessary to prevent governments from hiding protectionist intentions behind 
SHEC arguments. Even though many of these government imposed standards may be 
justifiable, the WTO DSB has found in several instances that measures were 
unnecessarily trade distorting (possibly expressly).
5 
 
The disciplines imposed by the TBT Agreement are mostly concerned with 
government imposed standards, though the Agreements also suggest best practice 
guidelines for the process of standard setting and removal of standards barriers (such 
as harmonization) both for industry and for government. It should be noted that these 
are expressly non-binding.  
                                                 
3 Similar provisions can be found in the Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) measures, 
which is concerned with standards aimed at preventing the spread of pests and diseases and ensuring 
food safety. SPS-related standards are, however, not subject of this paper. 
4 The implications of these conditions are elaborated in various WTO DSB Cases: “balancing”: Korea 
– Various Measures on Beef; necessity requirement: EC Asbestos; consistency: EC Hormones; process 
and production methods: US – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products. 
5 Cf. also Deardorff and Stern (1997) on the difficulty of disentangling legitimate measures from 
protectionist ones.   9
 
As argued above, in the case of compatibility of network goods/inputs, standard 
setting is generally private sector driven, giving rise to voluntary standards regimes 
that mainly convey information as to what is accepted/expected by the market. 
“Harmonization” is enforced by the market mechanism: incompatible products are 
driven out, unless a new standard is so strong as to capture a critical mass of the 
market. It is worth noting that markets, in this case, cannot be assumed to be confined 
to national borders. Where industries are global, the market will create international 
standards. Private sector organizations such as ISO and IEC have been instrumental in 
driving this process and have created a large number of voluntary international 
standards over the last decades.  
 
In the case of mandatory safety/health and environmental standards, government 
action is required for the removal of standard-related barriers. In addition, compliance 
with internationally agreed mandatory standards will subsequently have to be 
monitored on a continuous basis (this is done through conformity assessment 
procedures) and enforced by the individual governments. Since WTO disciplines in 
this regard are of relatively little stringency (as shown above), more ambitious 
approaches have been developed in the context of various regional trading 
arrangements, where it can be assumed that social preferences and constraints are 
more similar. These initiatives can be grouped as follows: 
 
•  Mutual recognition of product standards and technical regulations (if 
extended unilaterally, referred to as "equivalence" and not to be confused 
with Mutual Recognition Agreements for conformity assessment procedures): 
under mutual recognition it is presumed that standards, though varying per se, 
are designed to meet the same regulatory objectives and there is hence no need 
for a further agreement. This practice is very common within the European 
Union and covers approximately 28% of all products in the EU. 
•  Harmonization by essential characteristics (the EU's "new approach"): 
consists of defining essential safety requirements to be fulfilled by a product, 
but leaving the producer free to design the rest of the product as they see fit. 
These essential requirements often give rise to voluntary product standards 
developed by industry, implying that a product which complies with these 
voluntary standards also fulfils the essential requirements. Producers which do 
not comply with these standards have to prove in a different way that they 
comply with the regulation. This method was originally pioneered by the EU 
and has since then been adopted by AFTA and APEC. 
•  Harmonization product-by-product (EU's "old approach"): this approach 
was used by the EU until 1985 and involved tedious product-by-product 
legislation implemented through numerous detailed directives. Because the 
high technicality of the process threatened the goal of completing the Single 
Market by 1992, it was decided to abandon the product-by-product approach 
in favour of the “essential characteristics approach”. 
•  Compatibility (as used in NAFTA): there does not seem to be a formal 
definition of this concept in any of the relevant legal texts, yet it seems to 
imply harmonization of all regulations that are being newly created.  
•  Acceptance with specific exceptions: a country which has not adopted 
international standards still has to accept products from partners which comply 
with these standards, unless they can demonstrate an inability to adopt the   10
international standard due to "climatic conditions or infrastructural reasons" 
(e.g. AFTA). 
•  Acceptance with broad exceptions  (e.g. WTO) 
 
It should also be noted that the measures listed above are by no means mutually 
exclusive, but rather often exist alongside each other. It is for example the case for the 
EU that only 51% of regulated products are subject to harmonization directives, while 
the other part of regulated products are subject to the mutual recognition principle 
(The Single Market Review, EC 1998). Mutual recognition of standards is currently 
only applied by the EU, as it requires a strong enforcement mechanism (a role that is 
played by European Court of Justice). Harmonization of standards, on the other hand 
has been agreed upon in a number of recent preferential agreements, especially those 
with the EU as one of the partners as well as within AFTA and APEC. In the case of 
EU agreements, partners are generally asked to harmonize to EU standards (with the 
exception of EU-Chile and EU-Mexico, which harmonize to international standards), 
whereas AFTA and APEC ask members to harmonize to international standards. 
NAFTA members have agreed to make their standards “compatible”, which can be 
interpreted as harmonization, but the principle is only applied to standards that are 
being newly created. 
 
Besides these arrangements, which aim to overcome barriers posed by standards and 
technical regulations directly, arrangements concerning conformity assessment 
procedures (i.e. laboratory testing to see whether a product complies with a given 
standard or regulation) and mutual recognition thereof have been gaining increasing 
importance. These types of agreement are less intrusive than direct harmonization in 
that they do not require countries to change domestic regulations. MRAs for testing 
procedures are agreements between two or more parties to mutually recognize or 
accept some or all aspects of one another’s conformity assessment results (e.g. test 
reports and certificates of compliance), thereby avoiding the costs of double testing.
6 
Through MRAs, products that are tested and certified before export can enter the 
importing country directly without having to undergo similar conformity assessment 
procedures in the importing country. As opposed to Mutual Recognition of the actual 
product standards or harmonization thereof, MRAs for testing procedures do not 
require two trading partners to have comparable SHEC standards per se – they only 
require the exporter to fulfill the standards of the partner for the product they wish to 
export, but not meet the same regulatory objectives for their own country. In this 
sense, MRAs can be seen as a first step towards standards integration and they have 
indeed become an important tool for trade facilitation.   
 
Testing MRAs can come in two guises: technical and government-to-government (G-
to-G). Technical MRAs are concluded between technical bodies (testing laboratories, 
inspection bodies, certification bodies, accreditation bodies) and while they are non-
binding and therefore not enforceable, they often build the foundation for agreements 
at the government level. The latter are generally concluded for specific product 
sectors under government regulation. Examples are MRAs concluded between the EU 
and third countries (USA, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Israel, Japan, 
Switzerland). APEC’s Sub-committee on Standards and Conformance (SCSC) is in 
                                                 
6 Definition from Report of the Taskforce on Developing a Roadmap to Mutual Recognition 
Agreements in ASEAN; report submitted to 11
th meeting of the ACCSQ 11-12 March 1998   11
the process of negotiating them for the Asia Pacific region. MRAs can be both 
bilateral and multi-lateral as well as single- and multi-sector. While APEC MRAs, for 
example have been single-sector, the EU has generally adopted a multi-sector 
approach since negotiations of a multi-sector framework are arguably easier, as a 
rough balance of gains is more easily obtained. Further, G-to-G MRAs can be 
grouped into 3 different types: i) full harmonization of conformity assessment, ii) 
equivalence of compliance (a unilateral recognition of compliance), iii) full 
recognition of conformity assessment (conceptually these are similar to arrangements 
concerning standards directly – see definitions given in this context above). An 
example for full harmonization of conformity assessment regulation would be the 
EU’s Single Market framework. Equivalence of compliance is the basis to the Trans-
Tasman MRA between Australia and New Zealand, while the bulk of G-to-G MRAs 
relies on the third category of full recognition of conformity assessment results. The 
latter means partners are testing and certifying products according to the standards 
and requirements of the importing country; subsequently, a certificate indicating full 
compliance with those requirements is issued by the exporting country and must be 
accepted by the importer.
7-
8   
 
The main concern of the subsequent analysis will be to estimate the impact of regional 
TBT liberalization, in particular the effects of two specific types of initiative: Mutual 
Recognition Agreements on testing procedures as well as harmonization of product 
standards. For all other approaches the degree of implementation is difficult to judge 
in practice. Legal texts are often vague to the extent that they only recommend certain 
measures rather than being binding in this respect. The impact of MRAs on trade will 
be tested only for members of the agreement, while the effects of harmonization will 








The relationship between standards and trade has only recently started to receive 
attention from researchers. The main strands of the standards-literature have so far 




Firm level surveys have been conducted, attempting to gauge the direct impact of 
standards and technical regulations on firms’ production costs and hence export 
performance. The World Bank TBT survey looks at 689 firms in over 20 industries in 
17 developing countries (Wilson and Otsuki, 2004). 70% of these firms report that 
they face technical regulations in their export markets, whereby EU and US 
                                                 
7 Based on ibid. 
8 For a full list of MRAs and Harmonization initiatives, please refer to Appendix IV and V. 
9 For general overviews of the standardisation literature see Farrell and Saloner (1987), David and 
Greenstein (1990), Katz and Shapiro (1994) and Matutes and Regibeau (1996); the small part of the 
literature that is concerned with trade issues is represented by Matutes and Regibeau (1996), Kende 
(1992), Gandal and Shy (1996), Wallner (1998), Jeanneret and Verdier (1996) and DIN (Deutsches 
Institut für Normung, 1999); e.g. Blind and Jungmittag (2004), Jungmittag, Blind and Grupp (1999).   12
regulations are generally considered the most important by the firms surveyed. The 
study shows that in order to meet standards, firms invest in additional plant or 
equipment, one-time product redesign, product redesign for each export market, 
additional labor for production, additional labor for testing and certification, or lay off 
workers instead of making these types of investment in order to keep the costs from 
increasing.  
 
Quantitative analysis deriving the trade effect of diverging standards directly from the 
number or costs of standards has generally proven challenging due to the large 
number of standards in existence. Additionally, the wealth and idiosyncrasy of legal 
documents recording them makes it difficult to match standards across countries. 
Studies conducted in this vein are those by Moenius, 1999; Swann, Temple and 
Shurmer, 1996; Vancauteren and Weiserbs, 2003; Mantovani & Vancauteren, 2003.   
A general weakness of these attempts to estimate the impact of standards on trade is 
that they are generally not based on a sound theoretical framework. 
 
The attempts of modelling standards barriers and their remedies theoretically are also 
very limited in number and have been undertaken only very recently. All of them use 
Krugman’s (1980) framework as the basis to model trade between countries, but are 
very different in the way they are being implemented. One paper that has endeavored 
to formally model TBTs (yet not their liberalization) and showing the need to 
overcome them is Ganslandt & Markusen (2001). Baldwin (2000) as well as Mattoo 
and Chen (2004) take the analysis a step further by modelling both TBTs and their 
liberalization, cautioning against the discriminatory effects that the latter may entail. 
Mattoo and Chen (2004) find that harmonization in the EU raises both intra-regional 
trade as well as trade with excluded developed countries; at the same time their results 
indicate that it diverts trade away from developing countries. The paper also shows 
that MRAs have a more powerful impact on both types of trade, but if they contain 
rules of origin, then intra-regional trade increases at the expense of imports from the 
rest of the world, especially developing countries. In a firm level analysis Chen, 
Wilson and Otsuki (2004) show that testing procedures and lengthy inspection reduce 
exports of developing countries by 9% and 3% respectively and standards reduce the 






Melitz model and extensions 
 
Given recent developments in international trade theory, it seems that additional 
insight into the nature of technical barriers to trade as well as their liberalization can 
be gained by formulating a model in terms of Melitz’s (2003) heterogeneous firms 
framework. Melitz’s model constitutes an improvement over existing trade models to 
the extent that it is able to explain the many zero entries in the global trade matrix (i.e. 
the fact that more than half of bilateral country pairs have no trading relationship at 
all) as well as appropriately reflecting the asymmetry of bilateral trade-flows. Both of 
these features are obtained via the endogenous selection of individual firms into one 
or several export markets. Crucially, Melitz points to two margins of adjustment for   13
trade flows arising from this selection process. The volume of trade flows will be 
determined by the volume of exports by each individual exporting firm (the intensive 
margin) as well as the fraction of firms actually exporting (the extensive margin). The 
subsequent section will provide a brief introduction to the original model
10 and 
develop an extension to the theory so as to formalize regional TBT liberalization 
initiatives.  
 
As a general set-up for his model, Melitz (2003) uses the framework first introduced 
by Krugman (1980), in that he assumes a 2-country, 2-good, single factor-of-
production setting (the only factor being labour). One of the goods is homogeneous 
and is produced in the A-sector under Walrasian conditions. Trade for this good is 
costless. The other good is produced in a Dixit-Stiglitz monopolistic competition 
setting with increasing returns to scale and ice-berg trade costs
11,  τ≥1. Consumer 
preferences are represented by a two-tier utility function. The upper tier is Cobb-
Douglas and determines the relative expenditure shares on A- and M-sector goods 
respectively, while the second tier defines preferences over the differentiated M-
sector varieties.  
  ;
1 μ μ − = A MC C U    ,













i i M di c C  0  <  μ < 1 < σ    (1) 
CM represents consumption of the composite of all differentiated varieties of goods M 
and CA is consumption of the homogeneous good A, μ and 1-μ are the respective 
expenditure shares, N is the mass of varieties and σ is the constant elasticity of 
substitution between any two manufactured varieties. 
 
In the M-sector, firms face 4 types of cost: constant marginal cost of production as 
well as 3 types of fixed cost: F has to be paid in order to acquire a patent for a unique 
variety so that production is possible at all. Further, market entry costs FD and FX have 
to be paid for both the domestic and the foreign market respectively. These elements 
of the model will be of particular relevance for subsequent analysis. We will assume 
FX > FD, where FX can be interpreted as fixed costs arising from adaptation to 
standards and technical regulations abroad. It should be noted that previous models 
have considered TBTs to affect both fixed and variable costs. Since the analytical 
results for variable cost TBTs are straight-forward and the larger part of the costs is 
hypothesized to come from fixed costs, I will ultimately focus on the effects of 
changes in fixed costs following regional liberalization. 
   
Variable costs in the domestic and foreign market can be expressed as follows: 
 c i ai w    and  ci* ai τ  w       (2) 
where ci are sales in market i, ai is the unit input coefficient (or the firm’s level of 
inefficiency), w is the wage and τ the ice-berg trade-cost. The model departs from 
standard new trade theory in that it assumes M-sector firms to be heterogeneous in 
their productivity levels ai. In Melitz’s model, each firm draws their own ai from a 
Pareto distribution (this part of the model is crucial and will be developed further 
below). 
 
                                                 
10 Based on Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud (2004) 
11 The concept of iceberg trade costs is due to Samuelson (1954), who modeled transport costs as using 
up part of the good that is being transported. It is a very convenient way of modeling trade costs as it 
affects no other market.   14
The short-run equilibrium where the number and types of firms are fixed is 
characterized as follows: A-sector results are standard and straight-forward; 
ultimately, the conditions found in the A-sector ensure that factor-prices are equalized 
at w = w* = 1. In the M-sector, we will, crucially, see the following: two cut-off 
levels of ai will determine which firms will be producing at all, which will produce 
only for the domestic market and which will be able also to export, the intuition being 
that only a sufficiently high level of productivity (i.e. low marginal cost and therefore 
low price) will generate enough sales so as to cover fixed entry costs for the domestic 
or domestic as well as foreign market. The cut-off level for exporting firms will be 
called aX. Any firm with a unit input coefficient below aX will be efficient enough to 
be able to export. As in the standard Dixit-Stiglitz model, prices of M-sector firms 
will be a constant mark-up over marginal cost, ai and aiτ respectively. Prices for the 













p       (3) 
In the short-run, the mass of active firms is taken as fixed at n and the distribution of 
the ai’s is also given. The productivity distribution can be expressed as the pdf ρaD
-
ρa
ρ-1. Operating profits in Dixit-Stiglitz are simply 1/σ multiplied by firm-level sales; 
we can hence write operating profits in the domestic market as  
   πj
D = Bj 
σ n
E
          ( 4 )  
where E is market-specific expenditure on all varieties and n is the mass of active 
firms. Bj is introduced to simplify notation and captures biases in market shares of 
individual firms determined by their productivities aj: the average operating profit 
earned by firms is E/nσ, but firm j’s operating profits will be biased depending on 
firm j’s productivity aj relative to the average productivity a. If written out in its 
entirety, 













       (5) 
The expression in the denominator will later be called Δ for simplicity. For the export 
market, operating profits can be written as 
   πi
X = φBj 
σ n
E
          ( 6 )  
Total expenditure in a given sector is E = μL, where μ is the share of income spent on 
M-sector goods and L is total labour income, which is the only source of income, 
since in equilibrium there are no pure profits. As firms have to make fixed cost 
investments, short-run profits are just sufficient to cover these outlays.  
 
In the Melitz model, the long-run equilibrium is defined as a situation where no pure 
profits are earned. This condition will pin down the total number of active firms in the 
M-sector as well as the two productivity cut-off conditions aD and aX.  
 
Since M-sector firms are heterogeneous in the Melitz model, there seems to be the 
need to model this heterogeneity explicitly. Melitz does so by assuming that every 
firm wanting to produce a new variety spends a fixed cost F on a patent, not knowing 
in advance what the productivity level inherent in this patent will be. This is modeled 
by making the firm randomly draw ai from a Pareto distribution, G[a]=(a/a0)
γ, γ being 
the shape parameter of the distribution and a0 the highest possible unit input   15
coefficient.
12 Depending on the level realized, the firm will be able to export, solely 
supply the domestic market or not produce at all. We can implicitly define the cut-off 
points for aj via the free entry condition: for the domestic market (from the condition 
that operating profits equal fixed costs for the least profitable exporter): 














      ( 7 a )  
Similarly, for the export market: 















   where  FX >
 FD   (7b) 
From this, we can derive the value of an individual patent, which will be equal to 
operating profits minus market entry costs.  
 
The zero-profit condition in the innovation process on average will determine the 
equilibrium number of firms in the market. As the number of patents sold (which is 
equivalent to the number of firms in the market) rises, profits are gradually driven to 
zero. Ultimately, the long-run number and distribution of firms will be determined by n, 
aD and aX, which in turn arise from the simultaneous solution of the cut-off conditions 
and the innovation sector’s zero-profit condition yielding an equilibrium number of 
firms of  
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The productivity cut-offs aD and aX can be written as follows: 













































a F F a
a     (9b) 
 
 
Where aI is the cut-off value for profitability of the I-sector, which produces the 
patents. 
 
In what follows, the paper develops Melitz’s model further to formalize TBT 
liberalization in the form of mutual recognition agreements and harmonization 
respectively. 
 
It could be argued that mutual recognition agreements of conformity assessment 
procedures will lead to less of a drop in fixed costs associated with TBTs than 
harmonization. We could therefore model a regime change as far as MRAs for testing 
are concerned simply as a drop in FX implying less stringent conditions for exporters 
– aX will rise, while aD will drop due to increased competition from abroad.  
           
                                                 
12 the use of the Pareto distribution was first introduced by Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple, 2003.   16
Harmonization might have a more dramatic effect on the equilibrium as the fixed cost 
reductions will be more tangible. Firms within the harmonizing region will no longer 
have to comply with every individual standard in the area, but only with a single one. 
Initial costs of the liberalization might differ, since harmonization generally involves 
an upward adjustment of standards for participants to the most stringent standard in 
the region (this was the EU experience, cf. Chen and Mattoo, 2004). However, this 
complication is left aside for the moment. Harmonization will be modeled as the 
elimination of FX, which implies that firms will now make joint entry decisions for all 
markets in the region. This will give rise to a new productivity cut-off aS that will 
intuitively be less stringent than the previous two. The new cut-off point can be 
derived as follows: the free entry condition will have to be modified in order to reflect 
the joint entry decision of firms, which, having sunk set-up costs once, can now sell in 
every country with which technical regulations have been harmonized. We can write: 













       (i) 
Where h is the number of harmonizing countries. For simplicity, we assume that h=2. 




















      (ii) 
It should be noted, that we no longer have two productivity cut-offs, since firms now 
face a joint entry decision. Following the logic of the model, they will either not enter 
at all or enter both markets simultaneously (this analysis assumes away marketing 
costs and other sunk costs arising from the entry into foreign markets; this seems 
reasonable for regions, such as the EU, where integration has already progressed to a 
considerable extent in other areas and where hence knowledge of the foreign market 
is already good). From the equation above, we can now derive aS, the productivity 
level for which (ii) holds with strict equality. Solving for aS yields the following 






















a a        (iii) 
which implies that aX < aD < aS. 
 
The result that harmonization will make entry for countries in the harmonizing region 
less stringent seems obvious. It will be interesting, however to analyze the impact of 
such initiatives on third countries, in particular whether the impact differs according 
to the development level of the country in question. As for third countries with 
competitive industries (i.e. foreign industries that can compete with industries in the 
harmonizing region despite bearing the adjustment cost to the regional standard) it 
might be the harmonization of standards within a region that makes joint entry into 
the newly created, bigger market, profitable, while entry into each individual market 
before harmonization was not. We should therefore see a positive effect on the 
probability of entry for both, members of the harmonizing region and competitive 
third countries. As far as less competitive third countries are concerned, it seems more 
likely ex-ante that they will suffer a trade reduction. All of the above conjectures are 
tested below. It should be noted that the formal derivation of third-country effects will 
be highly complex, as discriminatory liberalization will lead to different productivity 
cut-offs for different groups of countries. Since the original Melitz (2003) model as it   17
stands is already on the edge of analytical tractability, one might have to consider 








The main features of the Melitz model (Melitz, 2003) discussed in the previous 
section and on which the empirical analysis will be based are the following: the 
representative firm of the classic Krugman (1980) trade model is replaced by a 
distribution of firms that differ in terms of their individual productivities. Due to the 
presence of fixed set-up costs, only a fraction of the firms initially participating in a 
“productivity lottery” will find it profitable to produce for the domestic market and 
again only a subset thereof will be productive enough to also be able to export, giving 
rise to asymmetric export patterns among countries.
13 The fraction of exporting firms 
from a certain country (the “extensive margin”) will crucially depend on the size of 
the fixed export costs as can be seen from the free-entry condition (equations 7a and 
7b above). This feature of the model will allow us to formalize changes in trade 
patterns due to regional TBT liberalization in the form of MRAs and harmonization.  
 
The empirical analysis is conducted in the framework of the gravity model. The 
gravity model is an adaptation to economics of Newton’s Law of gravity, stating that 
the volume of trade between two countries depends positively on their economic 
masses and negatively the distance between them. Taking into account Melitz (2003), 
the version of the gravity model presented here additionally exploits the fact that not 
all countries trade with each other and if they do, those trade flows are not necessarily 
symmetric. These considerations give rise to a two-stage estimation procedure, as 
derived in Helpman, Melitz, Rubinstein (2004; hereafter HMR), and similar to a Tobit 
II model. In addition to correcting for Heckman selection bias, HMR use Melitz 
(2003) to argue that a correction for biases arising from asymmetries in trade flows is 
also necessary to obtain consistent results. By explicitly including fixed export costs, 
their specification lends itself to the empirical investigation of technical barriers to 
trade.  
 
In general, the gravity equation framework has been used to estimate the impact on 
international trade of  
•  international borders (McCallum’s (1995), Wei (1996), Evans (2003) as well 
as Anderson and van Wincoop (2003)) 
•  preferential trading blocs (Frankel,1997) 
•  currency unions (Rose, 2000; Tenreyro and Barro, 2002) 
•  membership in the WTO (Rose, 2004; Subramanian and Wei, 2004) 
•  the size of home market effects (Davis and Weinstein, 2003) 
This paper will add MRAs of testing procedures and harmonization to the above list 
of policy initiatives being tested. 
                                                 
13 i.e. if a firm is “unlucky” in the productivity draw, its production costs will be too high to be 
profitable given the fixed costs it faces in the export market and possibly also in the domestic market.   18
 
It has often been criticized that many versions of the gravity equation used to this day 
lack theoretical underpinnings. Several authors have made attempts to tackle this 
point of criticism, among them Anderson (1979), Helpman and Krugman (1985), 
Helpman (1987), Bergstrand (1989, 1990), Deardorff (1998), Feenstra (2002), and 
Anderson and van Wincoop (2003). However, all of these theories assume positive 
trade between all trade partners, symmetric bilateral trade flows and the same number 
of exporting firms across destinations.
14 Based on Melitz’s (2003) theory, HMR’s 
version of the gravity equation, on the other hand, can be seen as a generalization of 
Anderson and van Wincoop (2003), accounting for firm heterogeneity and fixed trade 
costs as well as asymmetries in export volumes. 
 
HMR arrive at the following final expression for bilateral trade flows as a function of 
country characteristics (GDPs: Yi and Yj respectively, price indices: Pi and Ph) and 
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j a dG a V ) (
1 ε       for aij ≥ aL, 0 otherwise 
For the purpose of this analysis, it should be noted that the fixed export costs are 
hidden in the Vij’s which implicitly contain the level of fij through the productivity 
cut-offs, a (cf. section III). Equation (1) can then be written in log-linear form as 
 
 m ij = (ε-1)ln α – (ε-1)ln cj + nj + (ε-1)pi + yi + (1-ε)ln τij + vij            (2) 
 
Lowercase variables represent the natural logarithms of their respective upper case 
variables, where α determines the elasticity of substitution across products, Yi is the 
income of country i and Pi its overall price index, Nj is the measure (effectively the 
number) of firms in country j and cj is the cost of country j’s input bundle. Variable 
trade costs, τij, are assumed to take the form of iceberg trade costs. It is further 
assumed that these τij are stochastic due to unobserved i.i.d. country-pair trade 
frictions, uij ~ N(0, σu
2). We can hence write τij
ε-1≡ D ij
γe
-uij where Dij is symmetric 
distance between i and j. Further, vij is replaced by wij, where wij will represent the 
                                                 
14 Recently, some authors have explicitly taken account of the many zero entries in the global bilateral 
trade matrix and have suggested theoretical interpretations of this phenomenon. Among them are 
Anderson and van Wincoop (2004), Evenett and Venables (2002) and Haveman and Hummels (2004). 
Others have focused on the phenomenon of the extensive versus the intensive margin. Eaton and 
Kortum (2002), for example apply a similar principle to HMR to determine an aggregate gravity 
equation across heterogeneous Ricardian sectors. As in HMR’s model, the predicted trade volume 
reflects an extensive margin and an intensive one. However, Eaton and Kortum do not model fixed 
trade costs and the possibility of zero bilateral trade flows. Bernard, Eaton, Jensen and Kortum (2003) 
use direct information on US plant level sales, productivity, and export status to calibrate a model 
which is then used to simulate the extensive and intensive margins of bilateral trade flows. Yet, unlike 
HMR, these papers only accommodate corrections for individual issues raised by HMR, never all.   19
fraction of firms that export from i to j. Like Vij, wij implicitly contains the level of 
fixed trade costs, implying that the fraction of exporting firms will depend on fij. We 
hence have:   
 
 m ij = β0 + λj + χi – γdij + wij + uij       (3) 
 




HMR point out that the exclusion of wij will mean that the effects of trade barriers on 
firm-level trade would be confounded with their effects on the proportion of exporting 
firms and γ would hence be biased upwards; in order to correct for this, the selection 
of firms into the export market, wij, will have to be estimated itself in a first stage 
using a probit equation. The related latent variable in this probit estimation will be zij 
and  ( ) ij ij z ρ ˆ ˆ
1 * − Φ = . HMR show that  ( ) [ ] { } 1 ˆ ˆ exp ln ˆ * * − + ≡ ij ij ij z w η δ  is a consistent 
estimate for E[wij¦., Tij=1]. This will correct for unobserved firm-level heterogeneity.  
There is further the need to correct for Heckman selection bias using the inverse Mills 
ratio, here expressed as  ( ) ( )
* * * ˆ / ˆ ˆ
ij ij ij z z Φ =φ η .  
 
All of the above implies that we can estimate (3) consistently by transforming it into 
 
( ) [ ] { } ij ij u ij ij ij i j ij e z d m + + − + + − + + =
* * *
0 ˆ 1 ˆ ˆ exp ln η β η δ γ χ λ β η    (4) 
 
where βuη ≡ corr (uij, ηij) (σu/ση) and eij is an i.i.d. normally distributed error term.  
 
Since wij (and hence zij) implicitly hinges on the fixed costs faced by firms in their 
export markets, fixed cost barriers should turn out to be significant in the probit stage 
of the equation, whereas variable cost barriers are expected to turn out significant in 
the second stage. As many trade barriers impose both fixed and variable costs at the 
same time, it is hypothesized that the variables important in the probit stage of the 
estimation, i.e. those influencing the export decision of a firm, will be similar to those 
determining export volumes in the actual gravity estimation. It seems likely that 
harmonization initiatives and mutual recognition agreements affect both fixed and 
variable costs (Baldwin, 2000; Mattoo and Chen, 2004). 
 
In order to satisfy the exclusion restriction for identification of the second stage of the 
estimation, the set of variables in the first and second stages cannot be exactly the 
same. It will therefore be important to identify a trade barrier that affects purely the 
fixed cost of exporting, such that it can be dropped from the second stage of the 
estimation.  
 
For the purpose of estimation, dummies will be introduced for mutual recognition 
agreements and harmonization initiatives initially in both stages. Speculations as to 
their signs will be discussed below. The following specification will be used (see 
Table 1 for variable definitions): 
 
                                                 
15 HMR (2006) show that consistency requires the use of separate country fixed effects for exporters 
and importers as proposed by Feenstra (2002).   20
Stage 1 (probit): 
 
ρij = PR(Ti,j  = 1 ¦ observed variables) = αi + αj + αt + β1  lngdprep + β2 
lngdppcrep + β3 lngdppar + β4 lngdppcpar + β5 lndistwces + β6 contig + β7 
comlang_off + β8 colony + β9 lleither + β10 isleither + β11 wto + β12 fta + β13 
mra(sector) + β14 hr(sector) + β15 hr(sector)oecd_sgp + β16 hr(sector)_dev + 
uij 
 
Before turning to the second stage of the estimation, it will be helpful to relax two 
assumptions made in the original model. HMR show that results do not depend on the 
assumption of a Pareto distribution of firm-level productivities. By making vij an 
arbitrary increasing function of zij, they eliminate the non-linearity in 
* ˆ
ij w  and thereby 
the need to estimate the second stage by maximum likelihood. Instead, stage 2 can be 
estimated by OLS. They further drop the normality assumption for the unobserved 
trade costs (which was needed to recover the 
* ˆ
ij z  and 
* ˆ
ij η ) and work instead directly 
with the predicted probabilities  ij ρ ˆ .  The actual gravity equation looks as follows: 
 
Stage 2 (OLS): 
 
ln(sector)exp = αi + αj + αt + β1 lngdprep + β2 lngdppcrep + β3 lngdppar + β4 
lngdppcpar + β5 lndistwces + β6 contig + β7 comlang_off + β8 colony + β9 
lleither + β10 isleither + β12 fta + β13 mra(sector) + β14 hr(sector) + β15 
hr(sector)oecd_sgp + β16 hr(sector)_dev +  ij ρ ˆ  + 
* ˆ
ij η  + eij 
 
The predictions as to the direction of effects of individual variables are very similar 
for the two stages. Yet the interpretation is different to the extent that the first stage 
explains the impact on the probability that a certain firm is going to export (the 
extensive margin), while the second stage explains the increase in bilateral trade 
volume for firms already exporting before the liberalization took place (the intensive 
margin).  
 
As for the variables of interest, some preliminary comments seem to be in order at this 
point. As far as MRAs are concerned, only effects on parties to the agreement were 
investigated. Third party effects are difficult to evaluate in this case, as some 
agreements are subject to rules of origin while others are not. In the latter case, MRAs 
should have a similarly positive effect on competitive third country producers as 
harmonization, while in the former case markets remain segmented for countries 
outside the liberalizing region. It could not always be established from the available 
documentation whether rules of origin were in place, so no analysis of the effect on 
third countries was conducted. For harmonization, on the other hand, these effects 
were taken into account. Hence, two further dummies were introduced to this effect, 
which take on the value “one” if the exporter is a developing country and the importer 
is member of a harmonizing region, or respectively, if the exporter is in the OECD
16, 
but not harmonizing, while the importer is.   
 
 
                                                 
16 For the purpose of the analysis Singapore was included in this group   21
Table 1: Variable definitions 
Dependent variables: 
•  Stage 1: pr(sector)exp: binary; indicates whether there were positive export flows between a 
country-pair for a given year in a given sector 
•  Stage 2: ln(sector)exp: log of export flows between a country-pair for a given year in a given 
sector 
Explanatory variables: 
•  lngdprep: log exporter GDP in constant (2000) US$  
•  lngdppcrep: log exporter GDP per capita in constant (2000) US$  
•  lngdppar: log importer GDP in constant (2000) US$ 
•  lngdppcpar: log exporter GDP per capita in constant (2000) US$ 
•  lndistwces: log of distance between countries weighted by the geographic distribution of 
population 
•  contig: 0-1 dummy that indicates whether countries share a common border 
•  comlang_off: 0-1 dummy that indicates whether countries share a common official language 
•  colony: indicates whether countries have had a colonial link at some point in their history 
•  lleither: 0-1 dummy that indicates whether either of the countries is landlocked 
•  isleither: 0-1 dummy that indicates whether either of the countries is an island 
•  wto: 0-1 dummy that indicates whether both countries are members of the GATT/WTO at a 
given point in time 
•  fta: 0-1 dummy that indicates whether both countries are members of the same FTA at a given 
point in time 
•  mra(sector): 0-1 dummy that indicates whether both countries have an MRA with each other 
at a given point in time 
•  hr(sector): 0-1 dummy that indicates whether both countries have harmonised standards at a 
given point in time 
•  hr(sector)oecd_sgp: 0-1 dummy that takes the value 1 if the exporter is an OECD country (or 
Singapore) that is not part of a harmonising region, while the importer is part of such a region 
•  hr(sector)_dev: 0-1 dummy that takes the value 1 if the exporter is a non-OECD country that 
is not part of a harmonising region, while the importer is part of such a region 
•  ai and aj  are importer and exporter fixed effects respectively as used in HMR 2004. In the 
course of the analysis the validity of using country-pair direction-specific fixed effects, aij will 
also be investigated 
•  at is a time trend, capturing unspecified effects of the phenomenon of “globalization”  
 
As for the coefficients on the variables of interest, it is hypothesised that having an 
MRA or being part of a harmonising region will increase the probability of two 
countries trading with each other. If there were high volumes of trade between two 
partners already before liberalization, the export-probability might not increase any 
further, so the coefficient could also turn out to be zero. In the case of harmonization, 
we also need to make predictions about the effects on excluded countries. For them, 
the effect is expected to be more ambiguous. Two forces will be working in opposite 
directions: while a common standard will give firms in partner-countries a cost-
advantage, thereby possibly acting trade-reducing for third countries, it might be the 
newly integrated market that makes it worthwhile for third countries to export to the 
region in the first place. It is expected that the market integration effect will prevail 
over the cost-disadvantage effect for third countries with competitive export sectors in 
the industries under consideration. The effect for less competitive third countries (in 
this study the non-OECD countries) is expected to be less positive than that for the 
more competitive ones, yet a prediction about the sign of the coefficient seems 
difficult. Regarding the second stage of the estimation, it is expected that MRAs 
contribute to a firm’s variable cost and should therefore turn out to be significant. 
Since harmonization, on the other hand, is hypothesized to remove mainly fixed costs, 





The time period under consideration is 1986 to 2003. This is motivated by the fact 
that the EU’s Old Approach to harmonization was phased out in 1985, while the first 
harmonization directive investigated in this paper was passed in 1990. MRAs were 
mostly implemented in the late 1990s/early 2000s. The sample of countries includes 
all OECD countries for which complete data was available as well as the top 22 
manufacture exporting non-OECD countries.
17 The Czech Republic, Poland, Kuwait, 
and Taiwan were dropped due to insufficient GDP data. In total, the sample consists 
of 2256 country pairs (48*47) across 18 years. 
 
Bilateral trade data at the 3-digit level (SITC Rev.2) was obtained from the UN’s 
COMTRADE database. As is standard for analysis of trade flows, bilateral import 
data was obtained and subsequently converted into bilateral export flows. GDP and 
population data is from the World Bank’s WDI database, while contiguity, language, 
colonial and distance variables were obtained from the website of the CEPII. For 
geographical information, the CIA factbook was consulted. GATT/WTO membership 
and accession dates are as given on the WTO website. FTAs are those included by 
Rose (2003). Information on membership in MRAs and harmonization initiatives was 







The empirical analysis is conducted at the sectoral level. The two sectors being 
analyzed are telecommunications equipment (sample from 1991-2003) and medical 
devices (sample from 1986-2003) as their coverage by MRAs and harmonization 
seems widest. The sample contains 8 MRAs on medical devices and 14 on 
telecommunications equipment. By the end of the sample period, harmonization in the 
two chosen sectors had been undertaken only among EU members (in medical devices 
and telecoms equipment) and ASEAN members (in telecoms equipment).  
 
For medical devices, two separate regressions were run in order to account for 
possibly differing effects of the 1990 and 1993 harmonization directives, which 
covered active implantable and general medical devices respectively. Impact is 
expected to be slightly different between sectors due to the differing nature of the 
standard involved. While the telecommunications standards under investigation were 
designed to ensure compatibility
19, standards for medical devices were set to ensure a 
                                                 
17 For an exact list please refer to appendix III. Non-OECD countries in the sample are the top 22 
countries in the competitive industrial performance (CIP) index published by UNIDO in its 2004 
Industrial Development Report. The sample was restricted to only the most competitive developing 
countries as for others restrictions of manufacturing exports do not necessarily apply. Further, 
Krugman’s (1980) model which assumes Dixit-Stiglitz monopolistic competition and on which also 
Melitz (2003) is based only allows for intra-industry trade, whereas trade between OECD countries and 
LDCs is mostly inter-industry 
18 For a list of initiatives, please refer to appendix IV and V. 
19 In this case, it seems that industry was not able to generate a common standard, such that government 
intervention was necessary   23
certain quality level. Telecoms trade is therefore expected to increase more as 
products become more substitutable in the wake of harmonization, thereby making it 
possible to use equipment from foreign producers. In the case of medical devices, 
demand for products from abroad may actually fall as quality levels are raised to the 
same standard in all countries. 
 
A fixed effects probit estimation in the first stage combined with a fixed effects OLS 
estimation (corrected for Heckman selection bias and firm heterogeneity bias) in the 
second stage was implemented. Two versions of this model were run: one with 
separate exporter-, importer- and year-fixed effects and another with country-pair and 
year fixed effects.  
 
Which of the two is the more appropriate one, will depend on one’s theoretical 
assumptions about the trading relationship.
20 The country-pair dummy approach was 
implemented in the course of the analysis, though the results obtained seem to suggest 
that separating out exporter- and importer-fixed effects is more appropriate for the 
specification estimated here. Results for the country-pair approach are therefore only 
presented in the appendix.
21 In the specification being estimated, country-pair fixed 
effects will not capture reality as well as individual importer and exporter fixed 
effects. When estimating the impact of TBT liberalization initiatives at the sectoral 
level, it seems likely that country characteristics (i.e. idiosyncrasies in the regulatory 
environment of a country or “hidden technology”) will be more important in 
explaining trade flows than characteristics that are specific to the country pair. These 
idiosyncrasies are expected  to be particularly pronounced in the case of trade in 
medical devices as health systems vary dramatically from country to country. Also for 
telecoms, being subject to different regulations in different countries, the country-
fixed effect is expected to be more important than any country-pair fixed effects. 
Results obtained from the specification with separate exporter- and importer fixed 








                                                 
20 Cheng and Wall (2005) show that unless economic theory points into a different direction, country-
pair specific fixed effects should be used. The intuition behind this approach is that we might be 
looking for an omitted third factor that is common to a country-pair and that would induce the 
formation of a preferential trading relationship. It seems highly likely that the probability of two 
countries trading with each other as well as the actual trade volume between them is influenced by 
factors that are idiosyncratic to the country pair, such as special political interests, history and 
geography. This heterogeneity can be captured by introducing country-pair specific dummies, 
separately for each direction of trade. In this case, time-invariant country-pair specific factors like 
distance, colonial ties, common language etc. are subsumed into the fixed effects and must thus be 
dropped from the regression.  
21 If one were to further extend the specification to include time-varying country-pair specific fixed 
effects, one were to take full account of Anderson and van Wincoop’s (2003) critique in capturing what 
they call multilateral resistance terms. It should be noted, however, that the time-varying country-pair 




(see Appendix VI for detailed regression results) 
 
Stage 1  
The results from the probit estimation show that both mutual recognition agreements 
and harmonization of technical regulations have a significant impact on the selection 
of firms into export markets. Coefficients on the MRA variable are large, positive and 
significant at the 1% level for both telecoms and medical devices (1990 and 1993). It 
is worth noting that the coefficients on the telecoms MRA dummies are larger than 
the respective coefficients on WTO membership and in the case of telecoms MRAs 
more than twice as big as the coefficient on FTA membership. For medical devices, 
the coefficients on MRA and FTA are of comparable magnitude. The result that 
MRAs for telecoms and medical devices turn out to be significant, is also interesting 
in light of the fact that implementation of MRAs cannot be taken for granted. Results 
obtained here suggest that MRAs in the two sectors are indeed being implemented. 
 
Coefficients on the harmonization dummy are insignificant (for medical devices) or 
negative and significant at the 10% level (for telecoms), which would suggest that no 
extra firms enter the market of a partner country after harmonization has taken place. 
This could be explained by the fact that countries which implement harmonization 
directives, generally already have very close trading relationships, such that the 
probability of their trading with each other cannot increase any further. As for 
excluded countries, the results indicate that export decisions of excluded OECD 
countries are affected in a positive way and strongly so. This would suggest that the 
market integration effect by far outweighs any cost disadvantages that arise from 
having to adjust one’s product to a foreign standard in the case of competitive third 
country producers. This effect can be expected to be particularly strong after a large 
group of countries such as the EU harmonize standards. According to the results 
obtained here, developing countries do not see such positive effects on their exports to 
a harmonizing region.  
 
Using the cost interpretation for the first stage, results seem to indicate that 
conformity assessment procedures add a considerable amount of fixed costs for 
producers. Diverging national technical regulations, on the other hand, seem to be 
imposing fixed costs mainly on competitive third country producers. This is in line 
with the hypothesis by Chen and Mattoo (2004) that more advanced countries tend to 
cope with different national standards by redesigning the product, whereas developing 






In order to ensure identification of the second stage, the WTO variable was dropped 
from the system, after it was established that WTO membership is only significant in 
the selection equation of the model. Heckman selection bias was corrected for by 
                                                 
22 Cf. also World Bank (2004) Technical Barrier to Trade Survey.   25
using the Heckman two-step procedure and the probabilities estimated in stage one of 
the specification were introduced as correction for biases from firm heterogeneity.  
 
Results suggest that MRAs have no effect on the volume of bilateral exports in the 
telecoms sector, though they significantly increase trade in medical devices, implying 
that conformity assessments impose significant variable costs on producers of medical 
devices. The effect of harmonization on partner countries is negative and significant 
for both industries. Industry research (EC 2005, Medical Device Sector 
competitiveness study) shows an increase in intra-EU trade flows of medical devices 
around 1994, one year after the second harmonization initiative. However, extra-EU, 
US and Japanese medical device exports and imports pick up at the same time, 
suggesting an overall increase in demand, rather than a direct reaction to 
harmonization. The increase in trade volumes may therefore be picked up in the time 
fixed effects. The seemingly weak reaction to the 1990 and 1993 directives could be 
explained by the fact that harmonization completed product market integration: since 
firms lose their ability to price discriminate as soon as markets are no longer 
segmented, TBT liberalization must not necessarily lead to more trade, but could 
instead even cause a drop in trade volumes (Brander and Krugman, 1983). Ultimately, 
it would be interesting to see whether prices of partner countries converged after 
harmonization.  
 
It should also be noted that the sample includes only two harmonizing regions, the EU 
and ASEAN, whereby ASEAN’s harmonization efforts are very recent such that 
effects may not fully show until after the end of the sample period. Once more years 
will become available for ASEAN it will also be interesting to compare the effects on 
third countries of EU harmonization to regional standards with ASEAN 
harmonization to international standards. 
 
Effects from harmonization on excluded countries are either positive or negligible. 
Harmonization seems to have no important effect on the intensive margin of telecoms 
equipment or medical devices traded for competitive producers. For developing 
country exports, the coefficient on third-party harmonization is significantly positive 









Overall, the picture emerges that TBT liberalization initiatives have been very 
effective. MRAs and harmonization are shown to affect firms’ decisions to enter new 
markets more strongly than the export volumes of those already exporting. The recent 
export promotion literature increasingly recommends focusing measures on 
encouraging more firms to export rather than encouraging current exporters to export 
more. The results obtained in this paper suggest that MRAs could be a supportive 
policy instrument in this process.  
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The analysis also shows that firms in developing countries are generally not in a 
position to take advantage of such reductions in fixed export costs. They are seldom 
partners to MRAs or fully implemented harmonization initiatives and also do not 
seem to be benefiting from the market integrating effects of harmonization in other 
regions. One reason for their absence from international standards agreements is that 
the type of integration described in this paper relies heavily on enforcement by the 
individual member countries, for which institutions and capacities are often lacking in 
developing countries. Industrialized countries have therefore been reluctant to 
negotiate MRAs or harmonization agreements with developing countries.  
 
Developing countries could follow a gradual approach to remedy this situation, first 
building the laboratory and accreditation infrastructure to facilitate MRAs. Since 
MRAs for testing procedures only apply to the export sector, their enforcement will 
be less costly than the enforcement of a certain harmonized standard in an entire 
sector. Support and technical assistance from industrialized countries in this respect 
has been forthcoming and it is important that this continues to encourage MRAs 
between developing and industrialized countries as well as among developing 
countries. Deeper forms of integration such as the actual harmonization of product 






This paper contributes to the existing literature on TBT liberalization in several ways. 
Most empirical papers on the topic to date have lacked sound theoretical 
underpinnings. This paper attempts to correct this by using recent trade theory and the 
empirical framework linked to it and developing the model to accommodate the issue 
at hand. It looks at trade effects from TBT liberalization for members of the 
liberalizing region as well as two separate groups of excluded countries, industrialized 
and developing respectively. In order to conduct a meaningful analysis a dataset of 
more than 40,000 observations was compiled and the most recent econometric 
research was taken into account.  
 
The study finds compelling evidence that Mutual Recognition Agreements for testing 
procedures have a strong impact on both export probabilities and bilateral trade 
volumes. The evidence is less compelling for harmonization. In the case of 
harmonization, three cases need to be considered: the effect on parties to the 
harmonization agreement, on industrialized third parties and on developing third 
parties. The harmonization variable for partners is systematically insignificant or 
negative across specifications and stages which seem puzzling at first, yet economic 
justifications are presented above. For excluded countries, results are very much in 
line with theory. The order of the effect is mostly consistent across specifications, the 
effect on industrialized countries generally being more positive than that on 
developing countries. Results for changes in developing country trade flows are 
mixed, being positively significant only for telecoms in the second stage and 
negligible for others. In general, results are robust across different time periods and 
sectors.        
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Further, the first stage of the gravity estimation seems to confirm the theoretical 
conjecture that foreign standards and technical regulations as well as the testing 
procedures connected to them represent mostly fixed cost for OECD firms while they 
seem to affect variable costs for firms from developing countries, at least in the 
telecoms sector.  
 
In terms of future research, it will be interesting to differentiate between 
harmonization to an international standard vs. harmonization to a regional standard as 
well as account for the effects of the introduction of suppliers’ declaration of 
conformity. Appendix I – Derivation of aS 
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As far as the innovation sector is concerned, the auctioned patents will command the following prices: 
 
















  if aj ≤ aS     (4) 
 
Bj  in terms of firm j’s relative competitiveness can be written as follows: 
 
Further, the innovation sector’s zero profit condition is: 
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Combining the income equation E = μL         (6)     
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And recalling the definition of delta: Δ = λaS
1-σ (1+φ )       (8) 
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Further, we can write Bj for aj = aS as 
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From (7), we can therefore write 
 












          ( 1 3 a )  
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Substituting Bj into (13c) yields  D
e F λ π 2 =  
 
The ratio of firms that pay FS =1, so f
e = FD  
 
Hence,  ( ) 1 2 2 − = − = − λ λ π D D D
e e F F F f       (14) 
 
Re-arranging (6), then gives: 
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APPENDIX II – Derivation of the empirical specification following HMR, 2004 
 
The basic set-up of the model is that of Krugman (1980), where the demand side is 













j j dl l x u    0  <  α  <  1      (1) 












x  where  pj(l) is the price of product l in country j and   (2) 
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j j dl l p P   is the country’s ideal price index    (3) 
Prices are a constant mark-up over marginal cost due to the assumption of Dixit-Stiglitz 
monopolistic competition, so a firm with productivity level a, will charge the mill price of: 
a c a p j j α
1
) ( =         ( 4 )  
Firms face two types of export costs, iceberg trade costs τij > 1 as well as fixed trade costs fij > 
0 measured in units of labour, whereby the latter can be thought of as representing technical 
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) 1 ( ) (  where  Yi is aggregate y of importer i  (6) 
The cut-off level of profitability is implicitly characterized by the condition that the least 
productive exporting firm will just break even, i.e. for this borderline firm operating profits 
will equal fixed costs exactly: 
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Bilateral trade volumes can then be characterized as follows: 






j a dG a V ) (
1 ε       for aij ≥ aL, 0 otherwise (= proxy for the share of exporting 
firms)            (8) 
We can then derive the value of country i’s imports from j given the demand function and the 
pricing equation as   32
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Together with the export cut-off condition 
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HMR, arrive at the following final expression for bilateral trade flows as a function of country 
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APPENDIX III – Countries included in the Sample 
 








































El Salvador  SLV 







South Africa  ZAF   34
Appendix IV – Mutual Recognition Agreements 
 
MRA  PARTNERS  YEAR OF ENTRY 
INTO FORCE 
SECTORS COVERED 
EU - AUS  1998  Medicinal products 
Medical devices 
Telecommunications terminal equipment 
Low voltage equipment 
Electromagnetic compatibility 
Machinery (cranes etc.) 
Pressure Equipment 
Automotive products/vehicle components 
EU – CAN   1998  Telecommunications terminal equipment 





Good manufacturing practices for medical products 
EU – CHE  2002  Machinery 
Personal protective equipment 
Toys 
Medical devices 
Gas appliances and boilers 
Pressure vessels 
Telecommunications terminal equipment 
Equipment and protective systems intended for the use in 
potential explosive atmospheres 
Electrical equipment and electromagnetic compatibility 
Construction plant and equipment 
Measuring instruments and prepackages 
Motor vehicles 
Agricultural or forestry tractors 
Good laboratory practice 
Medicinal products GMP inspection and batch certification 
EU – ISR   2000  Chemicals good laboratory practice, applicable to 
-  cosmetics 
-  industrial chemicals 
-  medicinal products/pharmaceuticals 
-  food additives 
-  animal feed additives 
-  pesticides 
EU – JPN   2001  Telecommunications terminal equipment and radio 
equipment 
Electrical products 
Good laboratory practice for chemicals 
Good manufacturing practice for medicinal products 
EU – NZL   1998  Medicinal products 
Medical devices 
Telecommunications terminal equipment 
Low voltage equipment 
Electromagnetic compatibility 
Machinery (cranes etc.) 
Pressure equipment 




Pharmaceutical good manufacturing practice 
Medical devices 
EU-HUN




Hot Water Boilers 
Medical Devices 
Good Laboratory Practice 
Good Manufacturing for Medicinal Products 
                                                 
23 The EU-Hungary Agreement is technically not an MRA, but a PECA (Protocol to the Europe 
Agreement on Conformity Assessment and Acceptance of Industrial Products). PECAs are agreements   35
AUS – NZL   1998  All regulated products except those of national security concern 
AUS – SGP   2002  Medicinal products GMP Inspection 
Electrical and electronic equipment 
Telecommunications equipment 
CAN – KOR   1997  Telecommunications equipment 
Radio 
Electromagnetic compatibility 
CAN – CHE   1998  Pharmaceuticals 
Medical equipment 
Telecommunications equipment 
EFTA – AUS   1999  Medicinal products 
Medical devices 
Telecommunications terminal equipment 
Low voltage equipment 
Electromagnetic compatibility 
Machinery (cranes etc.) 
Pressure equipment 
Automotive products/vehicle components 
EFTA – CAN   2001  Similar to EU – CAN MRA  
SGP – JPN   2002  Telecommunications terminal equipment and radio 
equipment 
Electrical products 
SGP – NZL   2001  Electrical and electronic equipment 
SGP – USA   2004  Telecommunications equipment 
Intra – EFTA  
(CHE, ISL, LIE, NOR)  
Approx. 1996  Machinery 
Personal protective equipment 
Toys 
Medical devices 
Gas appliances and boilers 
Pressure vessels 
Telecommunications terminal equipment 
Equipment and protective systems intended for use in 
potentially explosive atmospheres 
Electrical equipment and electromagnetic compatibility 
Construction plant and equipment 
Measuring instruments and pre-packages 
Motor vehicles 
Agricultural and forestry tractors 
Good laboratory practice 
Medical products GMP inspection and batch certification 
Intra – APEC  
(AUS, BRN, CAN, CHL, CHN,   
CHN Taipei, HKG, IDN, JPN, 
KOR, MYS, MEX, NZL, PNG, 
PER, PHL, RUS, SGP, THA, 
USA, VNM) 
1999  Telecommunications 
Electronic and electrical equipment (electrical safety) 
Electromagnetic compatibility 
CITEL (Inter-American 
Telecomms Agreement)  




Intra – ASEAN 
(BRN, KHM, IDN, LAO, MYS, 
MMR, PHL, SGP, THA, VNM) 










                                                                                                                                            
with candidate countries by which mutual recognition operates on the basis of the acquis 
communautaire (i.e., they differ from Mutual Recognition Agreements (MRAs) in that they make use 
of common technical rules and standards).   36
APPENDIX V - Harmonization 
 
EU  90/396/EEC  Appliances burning gaseous fuels  
00/9/EC   Cableway installations designed to carry persons  
89/106/EEC  Construction products  
89/336/EEC Electromagnetic  compatibility   
94/9/EC   Equipment and protective systems in potentially explosive 
atmospheres  
93/15/EEC   Explosives for civil uses  
95/16/EC   Lifts  
73/23/EEC   Low voltage equipment  
98/37/EC   Machinery safety  
2004/22/EEC  Measuring instruments  
90/385/EEC  Medical devices: Active implantable  
93/42/EEC  Medical devices: General  
98/79/EC   Medical devices: In vitro diagnostic  
92/42/EEC   New hot-water boilers fired with liquid or gaseous fluids (efficiency 
requirements)  
90/384/EEC  Non-automatic weighing instruments  
94/62/EC   Packaging and packaging waste  
89/686/EEC  Personal protective equipment  
97/23/EC   Pressure equipment  
99/5/EC   Radio and telecommunications terminal equipment  
94/25/EC   Recreational craft  
87/404/EEC  Simple pressure vessels  
88/378/EEC  Toys safety    
ASEAN   Harmonization for 20 priority products was completed by 2003: 
Air-conditioners 
Refrigerators 












Cathode ray tubes 
Diodes 
Mounted piezo-electronic crystal 
Rubber condoms 
Medical rubber gloves 
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APPENDIX VI – Regression Results 
 
VI.1 Stage 1 - Country-Pair Fixed Effects  












Dependent variable  prtelcoexp prmedexp prmedexp 
























lndistwces  n/a n/a n/a 
comlang_off  n/a n/a n/a 
contig  n/a n/a n/a 
colony  n/a n/a n/a 
lleither  n/a n/a n/a 
isleither  n/a n/a n/a 



































2  0.4091 0.4641 0.4646 




***   significant at the 1% level 
**   significant at the 5% level 
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Dependent variable  prtelcoexp prmedexp prmedexp 




































































































Robust standard errors (clustering by country pair) are in brackets  
***   significant at the 1% level 
**   significant at the 5% level 
*   significant at the 10% level 
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VI.3 Stage 2 – Exporter-, Importer, and Year-Fixed Effects OLS Corrected for 












Dependent variable  lntelcoexp lnmedexp lnmedexp 




























































WTO  dropped to fulfill 
exclusion restriction 
dropped to fulfill 
exclusion restriction 
dropped to fulfill 
exclusion restriction 




































No. of observations  28,985 40,608 40,608 
 
 
***   significant at the 1% level 
**   significant at the 5% level 
*   significant at the 10% level 
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